بررسی رابطه بین مالکیت مدیریتی، اهرم مالی و سیاست تقسیم سود شرکت‌های دارویی پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران با استفاده از معادلات هم‌زمان

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد تبریز

2 استادیار حسابداری دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد تبریز

چکیده

مقدمه: مطابق با نظریه نمایندگی افزایش مالکیت مدیریتی به همسویی تصمیم‌های مدیریت با منافع سهامداران کمک می‌کند و رفتار‌های فرصت‌طلبانه مدیران را محدود می‌کند اما رفتار‌های مدیران ممکن است به میزان سود تقسیمی و اهرم مالی نیز بستگی داشته باشد. از این رو، مطالعه حاضر، بر آن است تا رابطه بین مالکیت مدیریتی، اهرم مالی و سیاست تقسیم سود را برای شرکت‌های دارویی پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران با استفاده از روش معادلات هم‌زمان مورد بررسی قرار دهد.
روش پژوهش: پژوهش حاضر، کاربردی با رویکرد پس‌رویدادی و طرح آن از نوع شبه‌تجربی است. برای دستیابی به هدف‌های پژوهش، تعداد 20 شرکت دارویی به روش شبه‌تجربی در بازه زمانی 1391-1383 انتخاب شد. در این پژوهش از روش معادلات هم‌زمان حداقل مربعات سه مرحله‌ای، داده‌های ترکیبی و نرم‌افزار Eviews نسخه 7 برای آزمون فرضیه‌های پژوهش استفاده شده است.
یافته‌ها: بین اهرم مالی و مالکیت مدیریتی شرکت‌ها و هم‌چنین، بین سیاست تقسیم سود و مالکیت مدیریتی شرکت‌ها و نیز، بین سیاست تقسیم سود و اهرم مالی شرکت‌ها رابطه متقابل منفی وجود دارد.
نتیجه‌گیری: نتایج پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که بین مالکیت مدیریتی، اهرم مالی و سیاست تقسیم سود شرکت‌ها رابطه متقابل منفی و معنادار وجود دارد. بنابراین، کاهش (افزایش) هر یک از آن‌ها افزایش (کاهش) دو متغیر دیگر را به دنبال خواهد داشت. هم‌چنین، مالکیت مدیریتی و سیاست تقسیم سود شرکت‌ها روش‌های جایگزین برای کاهش هزینه‌های جریان‌های نقد آزاد محسوب می‌شود و نتایج پژوهش حاضر با نظریه نمایندگی سازگار است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating the Relationship between Managerial Ownership, Financial Leverage and Dividend Policy of the Pharmaceutical Companies Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange via Simultaneous Equations

نویسندگان [English]

  • V. Taghizadeh Khanqah 1
  • Y. Badavar Nahandi 2
1 Ph.D. Student in Accounting, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz Branch
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz Branch
چکیده [English]

Introduction: According to the Agency Theory, an increase in managerial ownership helps to the association of management decision-makings with the shareholders' interests, and limits the opportunistic behaviors of managers. But, the behaviors of managers may also be dependent on the amount of dividends and financial leverage. Therefore, this research aims to investigate the relationship between managerial ownership, financial leverage, and dividend policy of the pharmaceutical companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange through simultaneous equations method.
Method: The present research is applied with an ex-post facto approach, and it is designed by a quasi-experimental method. In order to reach the purposes of the research, 20 pharmaceutical companies were selected within the duration of 2004-2012 through quasi-experimental method. In this study, in order to test the hypotheses of the research, three-stage least squares of simultaneous equations method, panel data, and Eviews Software Version 7 have been used.
Results: Between financial leverage and managerial ownership and as well, between dividend policy and managerial ownership, and also, between dividend policy and financial leverage, a negative mutual relationship exist.
Conclusion: The results of the research reveal that there is a mutual negative and significant relationship among managerial ownership, financial leverage, and dividend policy of the companies. Therefore, any increase or decrease in each of them would result in an increase or decrease in the other two variables. In addition, managerial ownership and dividend policy of the companies are considered as the alternative methods for reducing the costs of free cash flows. Furthermore, the results of the current research are consistent with the Agency Theory.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Agency Theory
  • Dividend Policy
  • Financial Leverage
  • Managerial Ownership
  • Signaling Theory
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